Testing Paternalism: Cash Versus In-kind Transfers in Rural Mexico by Cunha, Jesse M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2012-09
Testing Paternalism: Cash Versus
In-kind Transfers in Rural Mexico
Cunha, Jesse M.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37262






Welfare programs are often implemented in-kind to promote outcomes that might
not be realized under cash transfers. This paper tests whether such paternalistically
motivated transfers are justified compared to cash, using a Randomized Controlled
Trial of Mexico’s food assistance program. In relation to total food consumption, the
in-kind transfer was infra-marginal and non-distorting. However, the transfer con-
tained 10 food items, and there was a large variation in the extent to which individual
foods were extra-marginal and distorting. Small differences in children’s nutritional
intake under in-kind transfers did not lead to meaningful differential improvements
in child health compared to cash.
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1 Introduction
Welfare transfers are often made in kind rather than in cash. In fact, the governmental
provision of health care, housing, child care, and food vastly dominate cash transfers
in most countries, both developing or developed (Tabor 2002, Tesliuc 2006). Transfer
recipients, however, weakly prefer an equal-valued cash transfer as it offers the same,
if not more, budget choices. In light of this fact, many justifications for the use of in-
kind transfers have been suggested. For example, transfers in kind may induce the non-
poor to self-select out of welfare programs (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Bearse et al.,
2000; Blomquist et al., 2010); or they may facilitate pecuniary redistribution that is not
achievable through cash transfers (Coate et al. 1994); or they may be more politically
feasible than cash transfers (de Janvry et al. 1991; Epple and Romano 1996b). Perhaps
the most cited rationale for in-kind over cash transfers, however — and the one studied
here — is paternalism (see Currie and Gahvari 2008 for a review of this literature).
A paternalistic government uses in-kind transfers precisely to encourage the consump-
tion of transferred goods. For such transfers to be justified over cash, they must first affect
consumption differently than would an equal-valued cash transfer; that is, they must be
both extra-marginal and binding. If transfers are infra-marginal, the recipient would sim-
ply reduce market purchases one-for-one with the transferred good. If the government
cannot force consumption of an extra-marginal transfer, the recipient will have an incen-
tive to sell or trade it away. Thus, a simple model of consumer demand predicts that
both infra-marginal transfers and non-binding extra-marginal transfers with costless re-
sale will have no differential effects on behavior than would an equal-valued cash transfer
(e.g., Southworth 1945).
The magnitude of the distorting effect of in-kind transfers is of fundamental impor-
tance for policy makers, yet little credible empirical evidence exists for in-kind programs.
This lacuna of evidence arises from the simple fact that we can never simultaneously ob-
serve counterfactual behavior under an equal-valued cash transfer. In this paper, I take
advantage of a unique policy experiment and demonstrate how the identification problem
can be overcome through the use detailed survey data and a Randomized Controlled Trial
in which recipients are assigned to receive either an in-kind transfer or an equal-valued
cash transfer.
Specifically, comparing consumption choices under the cash transfer to how much
would have been transferred in kind identifies the extent to which the in-kind transfer is
extra-marginal; comparing consumption choices under the in-kind transfer to how much
was actually transferred identifies the extent to which the in-kind transfer is binding; and
comparing the extra-marginality of the transfer to the degree to which it is binding iden-
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tifies the distorting effect of the in-kind transfer. Such comparisons would be extremely
difficult to make without the random assignment of transfer type.
In this paper, I quantify the distorting effects of in-kind food transfers to the rural
poor. The program I study is the Mexican government’s food assistance program, the
Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL). The stated aim of PAL is a paternalistic one— to
improve food security, nutritional intake, and health (Va´zquez-Mota 2004). Participating
households receive monthly transfers (trucked into the villages) consisting of 10 common
food items, such as corn flour, beans, rice, oil, and powdered milk. Eligibility for the
program was determined through a means test, and take-up amongst eligible households
was virtually universal. Furthermore, program rules made it impossible for households
to self-select into the program. These facts allow me to abstract from motivations for in-
kind transfers, such as self-selection and tagging that can be important in other contexts
(Akerlof, 1978; Moffitt, 1983).
The experiment included about 200 rural villages and was conducted during the roll-
out of the program in 2003. The transfer type was randomized at the village level, and
eligible households received either the in-kind food transfer, an unrestricted cash transfer,
or no transfer (a control). When possible, a woman (the household head or spouse of the
head) was designated the beneficiary within the household. The analysis uses detailed
consumption and health data that was collected from participating households and indi-
viduals both pre- and post-treatment. Pre-treatment data confirm that the population is
poor (per capita consumption is less than two dollars per day), the transfers are large (at
about 12 percent of pre-transfer household consumption), and malnutrition is a serious
concern (e.g., 18 percent of children are anemic); as such, either transfer type had the
potential to improve welfare. I find that both in-kind and cash transfers lead to significant
increases in food and non-food consumption compared to the control, confirming the re-
sults of the initial government evaluation (Gonza´lez-Cossio et al., 2006), and restated in
Skoufias et al. (2008).
This paper extends these preliminary evaluations of the PAL experiment in several
important ways. First, I account for the fact that the in-kind transfer was in practice worth
more than the cash transfer when valued at local prices, allowing for an accurate test of
the prediction that infra-marginal in-kind transfers will have no differential effects from
equal-valued cash transfers. Doing so, I find that the PAL in-kind transfer was infra-
marginal for all households in terms of total food consumption and — consistent with
theory — I cannot reject the hypothesis that the in-kind food transfer and an equal-valued
cash transfer led households to the same increase in food consumption.
Second, I explore the extent to which the 10 individual items in the in-kind basket
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distorted consumption. These items and transfer amounts were specifically chosen by the
government in order to induce greater consumption of these goods, and information on
the degree to which individual goods distort consumption (compared to cash) is necessary
if we are to justify their use on paternalistic grounds. Indeed, I find a large variation in the
extent to which food items are distorting. For example, beans are a commonly consumed
food and in-kind bean transfers were small compared to consumption of beans under the
cash transfer; thus, bean transfers were largely infra-marginal. In contrast, powdered milk
was a sizable transfer relative to consumption under the cash transfer, and thus largely
extra-marginal. Despite over-provision of some goods, there is evidence that the extra-
marginal transfers were not fully binding for some households, as suggested by reported
consumption amounts under the in-kind transfer that were lower than the transfer amount.
Finally, paternalistic policy makers must primarly be interested in outcomes that re-
sult from the consumption of the in-kind good, rather than consumption of the in-kind
good in and of itself. For example, publicly provided labor market training programs
are ultimately concerned with increasing productivity and employment, not classroom
instruction time (the in-kind good) per se. Similarly, the paternalistic goal of in-kind
food transfers is to change health outcomes, not necessarily to induce consumption of the
particular transferred foods.
This is not a trivial distinction when transferred goods are substitutable with other
non-transferred items, and those substitute goods affect the outcome of interest. That is,
there is no reason to believe the specific transferred items (e.g., classroom instruction or
powdered milk) are the only ones that can lead to the desired paternalistic outcomes (e.g.,
increased productivity or better health). In fact, a simple theory of consumer demand with
multiple goods shows that recipients will reduce the consumption of substitutes of binding
extra-marginal in-kind transfers (and increase the consumption of complements). These
predictions were first formalized in the theory of rationing (Tobin and Houthakker, 1950;
Neary and Roberts, 1980; Deaton, 1981), and this paper provides the first empirical test
of the theoretical predictions in the context of in-kind transfers.1 For PAL food transfers,
I find evidence that binding, extra-marginal transfers induced households to substitute
away from similar non-transferred foods.
Thus, the preferred measure of the paternalistic benefits of in-kind over cash transfers
is their differential ability to improve outcomes of interest. For PAL, the main outcome of
1Neary and Roberts (1980) and Deaton (1981) independently generalize the Tobin-Houthakker (1950)
model of rationed consumer goods. These papers study constraints on consumption from above (rationing),
while distorting in-kind transfers are one example of such a constraint from below. Furthermore, these
papers consider only the consequences of rations or transfers that are fully binding, while the discussion in
this paper is the first to generalize their framework to allow for non-binding transfers or rations.
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interest is health, in particular child health. Using precisely measured indicators of child
sickness, height, weight, and anemia prevalence, I find minimal evidence of differential
effects of in-kind and cash transfers after one year of receiving aid. Nonetheless, there is
evidence that in-kind transfers led to greater intake of the essential micro-nutrients iron
and zinc than did cash. This increase is most likely due to greater consumption of the
iron- and zinc-fortified powdered milk included in the in-kind basket.
Independent of the questions surrounding in-kind transfers, a key finding of this paper
is that households spend very little of the cash transfer on vices, such as alcohol, tobacco,
and junk food, as is often feared by paternalistic program administrators. Rather, the
majority of the cash transfer is spent on nutritious food items such as fruits and vegetables.
This is important as it demonstrates that poor, rural households use unrestricted cash
transfers in ways that are (objectively) both individually and socially beneficial.
If there are paternalistic benefits to in-kind transfers, sound public policy must weigh
them against their costs. One cost of distorting in-kind transfers is born directly by the
recipient: equal-valued cash transfers are weakly preferred to transfers in kind, and thus
extra-marginal and binding in-kind transfers offer lower utility than does cash. A second
cost is incurred in distributing the transfers: it is likely that in-kind goods are more costly
to distribute than cash. For the PAL transfers, the in-kind basket costs at least 18 percent
more to administer than the cash transfer.
This paper offers important lessons for public policy. First, it adds to the literature
estimating the distorting effects of in-kind food transfers. Most of the existing evidence
comes from the United States Food Stamp Program, which demonstrates that these food
vouchers are infra-marginal for most recipients and thus treated like cash (Moffitt, 1989;
Fraker et al., 1995; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Whitmore, 2002). For those recip-
ients whose consumption is distorted, Whitmore (2002) shows that they have access to a
well-developed resale market in food stamps, and that over-provided stamps that are not
sold tend to induce consumption of some non-nutritious foods, such as soft drinks.
The developed country context, however, is very different from the one studied in
this paper, and we know very little about the distorting effects of in-kind food transfer
programs in low-income settings. Some evidence can be gleaned from the well-identified
econometric evaluations of the consumption effects of cash transfer programs to the poor.
Consistent with the findings of this paper, they largely demonstrate that cash is spent on
nutritious foods (e.g., Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) in Mexico, Attanasio and Mesnard
(2006) in Colombia, Maluccio (2010) in Nicaragua). However, cash transfers are often
conditional on school attendance and visits to health centers, or are coupled with in-
kind nutritional supplements for young children (e.g., Attanasio et al., 2005; Behrman
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and Hoddinott, 2005a). As such, conditional tranfer programs and hybrid in-kind/cash
programs are less useful for fully separating out the effects of in-kind food versus cash
transfers.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and pol-
icy implications. Section 3 describes the PAL transfer program and field experiment.
Section 4 discusses identification of the empirical results, which are presented in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 details the differential distribution costs of the PAL in-kind and cash
transfers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Cash versus paternalistic in-kind transfers
This section presents a simple model of consumer demand under in-kind and cash
transfers which guides the empirical analysis, identifying the situations in which in-kind
transfers will induce different choices than would an equal-valued cash transfer. It con-
cludes with a discussion of how the potential for such distortions can motivate the use of
in-kind transfers over cash by a paternalistic government.
2.1 A simple demand theory
Assume households have preferences over two goods, say, milk, qM, and a composite
good, qF , and that they maximize a utility function U(qM,qF), strictly increasing and
concave in both arguments. Pre-transfer, the household budget is represented by pMqM+
pFqF  Y ; pM and pF are the market prices of milk and the composite good and Y
is the household’s endowment. Line AB in Figure 1 represents this budget constraint
graphically. A cash transfer of T shifts the budget constraint up to CE, while an equal-
cost transfer of milk, qM(=
T
pM ), leads to a kinked budget constraint that depends on the
resale price of milk, pM:
pMqM+ pFqF 
(
Y + pMqM i f qM  qM
Y + pMqM = Y +T i f qM > qM
.
If resale is frictionless, pM = pM and the in-kind transfer is equivalent to cash. How-
ever, it is reasonable to believe that most in-kind transfers are discounted from the market
price, with pM 2 [0, pM) . This may reflect, for example, the search and transaction costs
of finding a willing buyer.
Clearly, cash is weakly preferred to the transfer in kind. This can be seen by consider-
ing the two households in Figure 1, I and II. Household I is indifferent between transfer
type, moving from indifference curve I to I0 under either transfer. Household II, however,
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is weakly worse off under the in-kind transfer, consuming at II0 (the kink) if resale is
unavailable and at II00 if resale is costly while it would have chosen II000 under the cash
transfer.
When frictionless resale is unavailable, the in-kind transfer of qM is extra-marginal
for household II as it consumes more milk than it would have under the cash transfer. The
in-kind transfer is infra-marginal for household I and is thus equivalent to cash. Note that
extra-marginality is defined with respect to the post-cash transfer budget (rather than the
pre-transfer budget), as a cash transfer may change demand for the in-kind good. This
distinction is important in practice when measuring the extra-marginality of a transfer
empirically. For example, suppose the in-kind good is normal and a transfer of qM is
larger than pre-transfer consumption. Compared to the pre-transfer budget, qM would
be extra-marginal. However, it is possible that the income elasticity is large enough to
induce a post-cash transfer consumption of milk greater than qM, in which case the in-
kind transfer would be infra-marginal.
The in-kind transfer is non-binding if the household consumes less of the good than
it was provided, and binding otherwise. For example, the transfer is non-binding for
household II when facing a strictly positive resale price (indifference curve II00).
It is simple to theoretically quantify the extent to which in-kind transfers are extra-
marginal and non-binding: choices under the cash transfer, compared to the quantity
that would have been provided in-kind, define the extra-marginality of the milk transfer,
EMM(qM); choices under the in-kind transfer, compared to what was provided in-kind,
define the amount of the transfer that was non-binding, NBM(qM). Letting qCashM and
qIn kindM represent demand for milk under cash transfer T and the in-kind transfer qM,
respectively, we have :
EMM(qM) =
(





qM qIn kindM i f qIn kindM < qM
0 otherwise
. (2)
The distortion effect of the in-kind transfer, DM(qM), is defined as the difference be-
tween the amount of the in-kind transfer that is consumed, over and above what would
have been consumed under a cash transfer:
DM(qM) = EMM(qM) NBM(qM) . (3)
In general, it is difficult to empirically identify the distortion effect of an in-kind transfer
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as we cannot simultaneously observe consumption choices under both the in-kind and an
equal-valued cash transfer.
Multiple goods and substitution
This model can easily be extended to cases when (i) multiple goods are transferred
in-kind and (ii) multiple non-transferred goods are available; such a extension is similar
to Neary and Roberts’ (1980) and Deaton’s (1981) analysis of the rationing of consumer
goods. With multiple in-kind goods, we must aggregate in order to compare the in-kind
bundle as a whole to an equal-valued cash transfer. One meaningful aggregation uses
market prices as a norm.2 Let (qn, pn) represent transfer amounts and associated market
prices for N in-kind goods, n= {1, . . . ,N}. With EMn (qn) and NBn (qn) defined as in (1)
and (2), we have:










The total distortion effect, with prices as a norm, is thus:
DTotal(q1, . . . ,qN) = EMTotal(q1, . . . ,qN) NBTotal(q1, . . . ,qN). (6)
The presence of more than one non-transferred good which are substitutes or com-
plements with transferred goods has important implications for the paternalistic benefits
received from in-kind transfers. Specifically, households will substitute away from substi-
tutes and towards complements of extra-marginal, binding in-kind transfers. For example,
suppose that cheese and milk are substitutes, and a household receives an extra-marginal
milk transfer which is binding: a simple demand model would predict that less cheese
would be consumed than under an equal-valued cash transfer. If paternalistic benefits
are derived from the total consumption of dairy products, not necessarily milk per se,
transfers in-kind will become less attractive to the paternalistic donor in the presence of
substitutes (and more attractive in the presence of complements).
Static versus dynamic consumption
Note that this simple model is time-independent, leaving resale as the only explanation
for observed non-binding transfers. In practice, however, some in-kind items may be
2Other norms can be considered, such as a count of the number of goods that are extra-marginal or
non-binding for each household, or caloric content in the case of food.
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stored temporarly or otherwise consumed in a lumpy manner.3 If consumption is indeed
lumpy and is only observed at one point in time (as in the empirical example studied
in this paper), empirical estimates of non-binding transfers will only identify an upper
bound on the extent of resale, and a lower bound on the quantity of the transfer that was
not consumed.
2.2 Social welfare and policy objectives
Clearly, the ability of in-kind transfers to distort consumption can be a strong motiva-
tor for a paternalistic government to impose their preferences on households when social
and individual preferences do not coincide. These preferences may not coincide for many
reasons. One important example is when in-kind transfers target individual family mem-
bers such as children or pregnant women, and cash transfers are given to a household
head, who is often male. Another is if recipients have time-inconsistent preferences. In
this case, in-kind transfers may be preferred by the household as a commitment mecha-
nism if distorted present consumption leads to better long-run outcomes.
Regardless of the motivation, only extra-marginal and binding in-kind transfers can
advance the paternalistic goals of changing consumption patterns differentially from an
equal-valued cash transfer. Thus, a first stage of policy analysis should be to assess
whether a given transfer will distort consumption.
However, distorted consumption in and of itself is not likely the end goal of public pol-
icy. Rather, it is more natural to believe that society is interested in changing outcomes
that result from distorted consumption. With food transfers, we care about improvement
in health rather than distorted food consumption per se. With public provision of educa-
tion, we care about increased knowledge and productivity rather than increased instruction
time or resource use. A second, and perhaps sufficient, stage of policy analysis should
therefore be to measure whether distorting in-kind transfers influence the outcomes of
interest differentially from cash.
If no distortion in outcomes is found, it will be difficult to justify the additional costs
associated with in-kind transfers. If, however, an in-kind transfer is found to distort out-
comes relative to cash, it becomes much harder to determine the optimal policy instru-
ment, as we must know how much society is willing to pay for its paternalistic gains.
3In programs that are expected to continue indefinitely, perpetual storage and an accumulating amount
of stored goods seems unlikely.
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3 The transfer program, experiment, and data
3.1 The Programa de Apoyo Alimentario
PAL, which started in 2004 and is still active, operates in about 5,000 rural villages
throughout Mexico. It is administered by the public/private company Diconsa, which
maintains subsidized general stores in these areas. Monthly in-kind transfers contain
seven basic items — enriched corn flour, rice, beans, dried pasta soup, biscuits, fortified
milk powder, and vegetable oil — and two to four supplementary items (including canned
sardines, canned tuna fish, dried lentils, chocolate, breakfast cereal, or corn starch). The
contents were chosen by nutritionists to provide a balanced, nutritious diet of about 1,750
calories per day, per household (Campillo Garcia, 1998). All of the items are common
Mexican brands that are not produced locally, but by and large are available in local
stores.4 The transfer is not conditional on family size, is delivered bimonthly (two food
boxes at a time), and the wholesale cost to the government per box is about 150 pesos
(approximately 15 U.S. dollars). Resale of in-kind food transfers is not prohibited.
A woman (the household head or spouse of the head) is designated the beneficiary
within the household, if possible.5 Transfers are intended to be conditional on attending
monthly classes in health, nutrition, and hygiene, designed to promote healthy eating and
food preparation practices. However, survey evidence suggests that this conditionality
was not enforced, rendering the tranfers unconditional in practice.6
Program eligibility is defined using census data and proceeds in two stages, where
first poor, rural villages are deemed eligible and then poor households within eligible vil-
lages are offered the program. Villages are eligible to receive PAL if they have fewer than
2,500 inhabitants, are highly marginalized as classified by the Census Bureau, and do not
currently receive aid from either Liconsa, a subsidized milk program, or Oportunidades,
a conditional cash transfer program (formerly known as Progresa). As such, PAL villages
are typically poorer and more rural than the widely-studied Progresa/Oportunidades vil-
lages.7 Household eligibility is determined through a means test, in which observable
4I do not observe actual food production; however household survey data on consumption of own-
produced foods shows that the only PAL good that is auto-consumed in any appreciable quantity is beans
(10 percent of households consume own-produced beans at baseline).
5For example, in the working sample defined below, 74 percent of households in both in-kind and cash
villages identify the recipient as female.
6Importantly, program administrators confirmed that neither cash nor in-kind transfers were ever with-
held due to lack of attendance of educational classes.
7PAL villages were typically not incorporated in Progresa/Oportunidades because they did not have
health facilities and/or schools in close enough proximity, as needed to fulfill the conditionality of Pro-
gressa/Oportunidades transfers.
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characteristics are weighted to create a poverty index and households falling above a
threshold are offered the program (Va´zquez-Mota, 2004).
Food aid boxes are assembled in several warehouses throughout the country and then
delivered to a central location in each village. Program villages are required to elect a
three-member Committee of Beneficiaries whose responsibilities include receiving the aid
packages from program administrators, disbursing them to participants, and teaching the
educational classes. Each household must collect its own aid package from the committee
and is required to present their PAL identification card in order to receive the package.
3.2 The PAL experiment
Concurrent with the national roll-out of the program, 208 villages were randomly se-
lected from the universe of PAL-eligible villages in eight southern states to be included in
a Randomized Controlled Trial.8 These villages were randomized into four groups using
a simple randomization algorithm. Eligible households in experimental villages would re-
ceive either (1) the in-kind transfer plus educational classes (the standard PAL treatment),
(2) an in-kind transfer without the education classes, (3) a pure cash transfer of 150 pesos
per month plus the education classes, or (4) no transfer nor any classes. All other aspects
of the program (the role of the Committee of Beneficiaries, the timing and delivery of
transfers, and eligibility requirements) were not manipulated by the experiment.
In practice, the randomization of the in-kind treatment into educational classes was
confounded, as the Committee of Beneficiaries appears to have taught classes in villages
that were selected to not receive clasess. Specifically, survey evidence shows that 63
percent of recipient households in the in-kind-without-education treatment arm in fact
attended at least one class (compared to 75 percent of recipient households in the in-
kind-with-education arm). It is not clear exactly what caused this departure from the
experimental protocol, although one speculation is that committee members decided in-
dependently to teach some classes upon learning that classes were part of the standard
PAL program.
Furthermore, very few classes were actually attended by recipients in in-kind and cash
villages that were supposed to attend them (likewise, few classes were attended by those
in-kind households that were not supposed to attend them). For example, survey evidence
shows that only about four classes were attended over approximately 12 months of treat-
ment, while program rules stipulate one class per month should be attended. Again, it is
8The eight states are Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and
Yucata´n. Appendix Figure A.1 contains a map of experimental villages.
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not clear why so few classes were attended, but the de-facto unconditionality of the aid
transfers must certainly play a role. (For further details on the education treatment and
receipt of classes across experimental groups, see Appendix A.)
For these reasons and to increase sample size, my analysis combines both in-kind
treatment groups (and I demonstrate that results are robust to excluding the in-kind-
without-education group).
3.3 Data
In each experimental village, a random sample of approximately 33 households were
selected for inclusion in pre- and post-intervention surveys that were administered to the
female head of the household, if possible. The surveys were administered by Mexic’s Na-
tional Institute of Public Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud Publica (INSP)), a different
government agency than the one administering PAL. INSP was intentionally chosen to
conduct the surveys so that respondents would not (mistakenly) think that their responses
would affect the receipt of aid. The pre-intervention round was conducted between Oc-
tober 2003 and April 2004, before the means-test was applied in the cash and in-kind
villages. The post-intervention round was conducted two years later in the final quarter of
2005. PAL began to phase-in aid delivery after the baseline surveys, completing coverage
within a year.
Household food consumption is defined as the sum of expenditures on individual
foods eaten within the home plus expenditures on food eaten away from the home. A
seven-day recall on 61 food items was used to capture consumption of food eaten in the
home, and I construct village median unit-values as measures of prices in order to aggre-
gate across goods. A single question captured consumption expenditure on foods eaten
away from home. Household non-food consumption was captured in 23 non-food cate-
gories designed to cover the extent of non-durable, non-food consumption. All household
food and non-food variables are converted to monthly levels for ease of comparison with
PAL transfers.9
At the individual level, I use data on child food consumption and health. Individual
food consumption was measured with a rolling 24-hour recall module for children aged
one to four in the baseline and aged two to six in the followup. Consumption quantities
were converted by INSP into caloric and micro-nutrient content using standard conver-
sion factors; unfortunately, I do not have data on the specific foods that were consumed
9Appendix B contains further details on the construction of unit-values and household consumption
variables. Appendix Table A.2 lists all goods (PAL and non-PAL) used in the analysis..
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by children. At times, I compare consumption to age-specific Recommended Dietary
Allowances (RDAs) in order to assess the relative extent of under-nourishment.
Child health measures include height, weight, sickness, and anemia prevelance. Height
and weight were measured by the survey team for children aged zero to four in the base-
line and aged zero to six in the followup; the survey respondent was asked to report the
number of sick days in the last month for all children in both waves; and hemoglobin
blood tests (to detect anemia) were administered for children aged two to six, though
only in the post-treatment wave.10
Table 1 summarizes the seven basic and three supplementary items - lentils, canned
fish, and breakfast cereal - that were included in the PAL food basket at the time of the
follow-up survey in late 2005.11 All of the items are non-perishable as delivered and
the distribution of caloric content suggests that the basket is the basis of a balanced diet,
although notably absent are fruits and vegetables. At local pre-program prices, the PAL
in-kind package is worth about 205 pesos. The powdered milk and corn flour are fortified
with iron, zinc, and folic acid, three micro-nutrients known to be deficient in the Mexican
diet (Barquera et al., 2001). The fortified items comprise about half the value of the box
(92 pesos), a choice consistent with paternalistic preferences for greater micro-nutrient
intake.
Note that the 150 peso cash transfer could only purchase about 73 percent of the in-
kind basket. This discrepancy arose because the government set the cash transfer equal
to their wholesale cost of purchasing the in-kind food basket, which was about 150 pesos
per box. In order to make the policy-relevant comparison to equal-valued transfers, I
extrapolate from observed program effects under cash transfers in the parametric analysis
below (details to follow).
3.4 Eligibility and receipt of the aid
Information on the receipt of the program was self-reported by households in the
post-intervention survey. Approximately 88 percent of surveyed households in cash and
in-kind villages reported having received PAL transfers; one control household reported
receiving the program.12 On average, households report receiving about 12 months of aid
10A child is classified as anemic if the altitude-adjusted concentration of hemoglobin in the blood is lower
than 11 grams per deciliter (g/dL) for ages two to four, and 11.5 g/dL for ages five and six.
11It is unclear whether experimental households received canned tuna fish (weighing 0.35 kg) or canned
sardines (weighing 0.8 kg). As the household food recall survey asks about these items jointly, I assume
the mean weight and calories throughout.
12Unfortunately, program administrators do not have household-level records on eligibility for PAL or
on the receipt of transfers during the roll-out of the program (the experimental years).
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in between survey waves — an important factor in interpreting the cumulative effect of
aid packages on child health.
While the main focus of this paper is comparisons between in-kind and cash trans-
fers, comparisons with the counterfactual of receiving no transfer are also of interest. As
I do not directly observe eligibility in the control group, I use a two-step process in or-
der to identify the those households who would have been eligible for the program in
experimental years.
First, I merge the survey data with administrative data identifying recipients of PAL
transfers in control villages after the experiment concluded, in 2006. About 49 percent
of control villages were incorporated into the program in 2006 and, importantly, control
households were assigned to treatment using the same means test that determined eligi-
bility for cash and in-kind households.13
Second, in the remaining 51 percent of control villages, I predict program eligibility
using a matching procedure as follows: I first re-create the government’s means test that
was initially used to assign program eligibility. Specifically, I estimate a probit model that
predicts observed program eligibility in the in-kind and cash treatment groups (combined)
as a function of the same set of observable characteristics used in the government’s means
test (SEDESOL, 2001). I then use this fitted model to predict for each household in the
remaining control villages the probability of being eligible for PAL. Finally, I assign the
same percentage of control group households to treatment (88.4 percent) as are observed
in the in-kind and cash groups. (Appendix Table A.3 contains the estimated marginal ef-
fects from the probit model and shows the characteristics used in the prediction exercise.)
In practice, the household characteristics poorly explain the receipt of PAL aid. The
McFadden’s adjusted R-squared of the probit model is 0.009, estimated marginal effects
are economically small, and none are significantly different from zero. It appears as if
the approximately 12 percent of ineligible households in in-kind and cash villages are
indistinguishable from the eligible ones (this statement holds comparing other observ-
able characteristics not used in the means test). It is beyond the scope of this paper to
explain why the program is not well targeted in this population. One speculation is that
the government eligibility index was created using the entire population of Mexico and
thus does not predict poverty well for this sample, amongst the most disadvantaged and
rural households. Regardless, I perform robustness analyses below and demonstrate that
the choice of eligible control households does not affect any results, including the main
comparisons of interest between cash and in-kind transfer groups.
13It is not clear why the other 51 percent were not incorporated into PAL in 2006. One possibility is that
these villages became eligible to receive Progresa/Oportunidades instead.
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3.5 Sample and baseline balance
The analysis uses only PAL recipient households in cash and in-kind villages and
eligible households in control villages (identified as described above). Of the original
208 experimental villages, two could not be re-surveyed due to concerns for enumera-
tor safety and six more are excluded for various reasons: two were incorporated in PAL
prior to the pre-treatment survey; two villages were deemed ineligible for the experiment
because they were receiving the conditional cash transfer program, Oportunidades, con-
trary to PAL rules; and two villages are geographically contiguous, potentially violating
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)14. Observable characteristics of
excluded villages are balanced across treatment arms (results available upon request). Of
the remaining 200 villages, three received the wrong treatment (one in-kind village did
not receive the program, one cash village received both in-kind and cash transfers, and one
control village received in-kind transfers). I include these villages and interpret estimates
as intent-to-treat estimates.
Household attrition was low; however, it was significantly higher for the control group
(17.4 percent) than for the in-kind and cash groups (11.6 and 12.0 percent, respectively).15
I exclude a small number of households that were missing more than half of the consump-
tion variables, were missing individual-level data, or reported preparing a special meal in
the food recall window (together 0.3 percent of the sample). In the child-level analysis, I
exclude several children who have inconsistent ages across waves or have extreme outliers
in consumption (together 0.5 percent of the sample). Further details on the construction
of this sample are available in Appendix B.
Table 2 contains means, by treatment group, of household and village characteris-
tics and suggests that the randomization was successful. Baseline characteristics are for
the most part balanced across groups. Three variables do display significant differences
across groups: household heads in the cash group are slightly less educated then heads
in the in-kind group and the control; the cash group has more households that raise ani-
mals or farm than does the control; and in-kind villages are more likely to have a Diconsa
store than control villages. Note that for the primary comparison of interest — between
cash and in-kind treatments — only one variable is unbalanced at baseline, and with a
significance level above 0.05.
Table 2 also demonstrates the sample is poor: monthly total consumption (food plus
14The contiguous villages are named “Section 3 of Adalberto Tejada” and “Section 4 of Adalberto Te-
jada,” so they appear to be part of the same administrative unit.
15The difference in attrition rates between the in-kind and cash groups is strongly insignificant. Note
these attrition statistics necessarily include ineligible households, as household eligibility is not observed
prior to treatment.
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non-food) per capita is about 480 pesos per month, or about 48 U.S. dollars. Furthermore,
the budget share of food out of total consumption expenditure is large, at about 60 percent.
Table 3 contains means, by treatment group, for child level demographics and out-
comes; none of the variables are significantly different across groups at the 10 percent
level or below, again suggesting that the randomization was successful.
It is difficult to make absolute statements about child health from the consumption
data, as the 24-hour food recall module could over- or understate actual consumption.
Nonetheless, comparing caloric and micro-nutrient intake to RDAs (not shown) suggests
that most children consume too few calories and that for many, those calories do not
contain enough essential micro-nutrients. Specifically, 88 percent of children consume
fewer than the RDA of calories, and 32, 47, and 41 percent of children are not consuming
the RDA of iron, vitamin C, and zinc, respectively.
In terms of mesured health, about 12 percent of children were sick in the last week.
Comparing weight and height with age-specific reference groups implies nine percent are
under-weight and 18 percent are stunted (both defined as being less than two standard
deviations below the mean). Finally, anemia, predominately caused by iron deficiency, is
highly prevalent (22 percent) among children in the control group post-treatment.
4 Identification and empirical strategy
Theory predicts that only extra-marginal and binding in-kind transfers will induce
differential consumption compared to an equal-valued cash transfer, and it is precisely
this distortion that is of interest to a paternalistic government. Therefore, I first estimate
the distribution across households of the extra-marginality of the PAL in-kind transfers
(EMn and EMTotal in equations 1 and 4) by comparing consumption choices of in-kind
foods under the cash transfer to what would have been provided in-kind. Then, I estimate
the extent to which the PAL transfers were non-binding (NBn and NBTotal in equations 2
and 5) by comparing the distribution of consumption choices under the in-kind transfer to
amounts actually provided.
Subject to two caveats, randomization ensures that the difference in means between
the distributions of extra-marginal and non-binding transfers identifies the distortion ef-
fect of the in-kind transfers (EMn and EMTotal in equations 3 and 6). The first caveat
is that while EMn and EMTotal are correctly identified under an equal-valued cash trans-
fer, in practice the cash transfer could only purchase about 73 percent of the in-kind
basket. It is difficult to adjust for this unequal value of the cash and in-kind transfers non-
parametrically (a task more suited to a parametric analysis). However, if the in-kind foods
are normal goods, the distribution of extra-marginal transfers provides an upper bound on
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the degree of extra-marginality of the PAL transfers.
The second caveat is that household consumption is only observed for a one-week pe-
riod at some time between receipt of in-kind transfers. Therefore, it is difficult to separate
between the resale of in-kind goods (which detracts from the paternalistic motive) and
storage or otherwise lumpy consumption (which supports the paternalistic motive, in that
the household will at some point consume the goods).16,17
Theory also predicts that households will substitute away from substitutes and to-
wards complements of distorting in-kind transfers. Therefore, I next turn to a paramet-
ric analysis which allows for a more compact comparison of average treatment effects
on consumption for various aggregations of PAL and non-PAL goods. This estimation
framework also facilitates a straightforward comparison of equal-valued transfers, as de-
scribed below. Finally, I use this parametric framework to look for differential effects of
transfer type on child nutrition and health.
Equal-valued transfers
I estimate the effect of equal-valued transfers as follows: Let ATT (Cash), ATT (IK),
and ATT (IK-Cash) refer to the average treatment effects on the treated under the cash
treatment relative to the control, the in-kind treatment relative to the control, and the in-
kind relative to the cash treatment, respectively. ATT (Cash) are thus identified through
the exogenous income shock and are local estimates of the slopes of Engel curves. There-
fore, a first-order approximation of the average treatment effects of equal-valued cash
transfers are identified through ATTEQ(Cash) = ATT (Cash) ⇤ MeanBasketValueCashTrans f erAmount . Like-
wise, ATTEQ(IK-Cash) = ATT (IK) ATTEQ(Cash) identifies the differential effects of
equal-valued cash and in-kind transfers.
Note that this linear extrapolation incorporats an assumption that goods are not local
necessities or luxuries; however, the small size of the extrapolation (about 2.5 percent
of baseline household consumption) limits the magnitude of potential biases if these as-
sumptions fail.18 While the assumptions justifying linear Engel curves for consumption
goods are relatively benign, it is perhaps less plausible to assume that Engel curves for
health outcomes are linear; doing so would require additional assumptions about the shape
of health production functions. As such, I do not extrapolate treatment effects for child
16This caveat limits the extent to which this exercise measures the ”stickiness” or ”flypaper” effect of the
transfers for the household as a whole (Jacoby 2002; Islam and Hoddinott 2009).
17The survey does not identify the temporal difference between the survey date and the receipt of the
PAL transfer with enough precision to permit exploration of heterogeneous treatment effects along this
dimension.
18In related ongoing work, I estimate flexible income elasticites for the goods in the data in the framework
of a formal demand system, and find that Engel curves are by and large linear. See also Attanasio et al.
(2009) for evidence that food items in Mexico are neither strong necessities nor luxuries.
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height, weight, sickness, and anemia prevelance. To the extent that health outcomes are
increasing in income, pure treatment effects serve as upper bounds on the equal-valued
in-kind over cash effects.
Estimation of average treatment effects on the treated
To improve efficiency, treatment effects are estimated using a difference-in-differences
regression estimator:19












+X jl + ei jt (7)
Yi jt is the outcome for household or individual i in village j at time t, POSTt is an indica-
tor for the post-intervention survey, GROUPg j,g 2 {1,2} are cash and in-kind treatment
group indicators, and Xj is a vector of pre-intervention village characteristics that show
slight imbalance at baseline: indicators for the presence of a Diconsa store in the village
and the month of the interview. The estimated parameters bbg identify average treatment
effects on the treated for in-kind and cash groups, ATT (IK) and ATT (Cash), while their
difference identifies ATT (IK-Cash).20 Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
19As treatment data comes from self-reports, identification of treatment effects on the treated through
equation 7 necessitates the assumption that eligibility determines take-up uniquely. Four pieces of evidence
suggest that this is likely the case. First, the transfers are in practice unconditional. Even if class attendance
was enforced (or if the recipient believed it would be enforced), the opportunity cost of time would have
to be rather large for a household to decline the program due to the time commitment involved. Second,
adverse stigma effects associated with participation (as in Moffitt, 1983) are unlikely in this context where
over 90 percent of households receive the program. Third, evidence from Oportunidades, with a similar
population to the PAL villages, shows that the take-up rate among eligible households was above 97 percent
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). Finally, households were required to present their identification cards to
receive aid packages and villages were only delivered enough packages to cover incorporated households,
making it unlikely that ineligible households in fact received aid.
20In-kind and cash transfers, injected into partially closed economies, may effect prices — cash transfers
through an income effect, and in-kind transfers through both income and supply effects. Estimates from
equation 7 include both the direct effect of transfers and any such pecuniary effects. In related work (Cunha
et al., 2012), we show that the pecuniary effects for PAL transfers are small: prices did not increase under
cash transfers, while in-kind transfers cause the prices of transferred goods to fall by 3 to 4 percent. Com-
bining the effects on both PAL and non-PAL goods (which are potential substitutes of PAL goods), we find
modest general equilibrium effects in both in-kind and cash villages of equal magnitude (equivalent to an
additional 5 percent of the transfer value).
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5 Results
5.1 Extra-marginal and non-binding in-kind transfers
Are PAL in-kind transfers extra-marginal? It is important to first note that in terms of
total food consumption, the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal for virtually all households.
That is, under the 150 peso cash transfer no household consumes fewer than 150 pesos
of food per month, and 0.01 percent of the sample consumes fewer than 205 pesos of
food per month, the local value of the in-kind basket. However, there appears to be
considerable over-provision for some individual PAL goods.
The solid curves in Figure 2 are empirical CDFs of monthly quantities consumed of
each PAL item by post-transfer cash households (note the different scales on the horizon-
tal axes); the samples are top coded at the 95th percentile for expositional convenience. I
discuss the dashed curves below. The vertical lines delineate the PAL transfer quantities,
qn. For households consuming less than qn, the distance to the vertical line is the extra-
marginality of each item, EMn(qn). Evidently, many households do not consume the
in-kind foods at all, even after receiving a sizable cash transfer. For example, powdered
milk and canned fish are not consumed by about 82 percent and 76 percent of households,
respectively.
Integration of each CDF from zero to the vertical line would provide an estimate of
the average quantity over-provided for the sample as a whole. The intersection of the
CDF and the vertical line identifies the percentage of over-provided households, or the
extensive margin of over-provision. Some items, such as beans and oil, are over-provided
to only a few households (9.6 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively) while others, such
as milk powder and lentils, are over-provided to most households (90.2 percent and 87.1
percent, respectively).
The aggregate value of extra-marginal transfers for each household is obtained as
in equation 4, using village level prices. However, it will prove convenient to express
EMTotal(q1, . . . ,q10) for each household as a percentage of the value of the in-kind basket
— this distribution is plotted as the solid kernel density in Figure 3.21 Over-provision is
obviously not limited to a subset of households.22 This density estimates the extent to
which the PAL in-kind food basket would distort consumption, if it was perfectly binding
21Algebraically, this kernel density estimates the distribution of EMTotal(q1,...,q10)
Â10n=1 pn, jqn




22Aggregating by the number of items which are extra-marginal leads to a similar conclusion: 99.6
percent of households were over-provided with at least one good, while 53.3 percent were over-provided
with five or more goods.
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(that is, the entire transfer was consumed). On average, 62.3 percent of the transfer was
extra-marginal (the solid vertical line). However, note that the variance across households
is large implying the burden of over-provision varies across the population.
Are PAL in-kind transfers consumed? The paternalistic benefits of in-kind transfers
are lessened to the extent that households do not consume what was provided. Subject
to the caveat concerning the lumpiness of consumption throughout the month, the dashed
CDFs in Figure 2 estimate the extent to which in-kind transfers were non-binding, plotting
monthly post-transfer household consumption of in-kind goods by households in the in-
kind group. Transfers are non-binding for households to the left of the vertical line, qn.
Infra-marginal transfers are by definition binding, so it is not surprising that the most
infra-marginal items are those commonly consumed in large quantities, such as beans
and oil. The three supplementary items, lentils, canned fish, and breakfast cereal are
non-binding for most households (61 percent, 52 percent and 70 percent, respectively).
Transfers of these items were small in quantity, suggesting that this lack of observed
consumption may be a result of lumpy consumption over time; however, there is no way
to rule out that the lack of consumption is due to inter-household transfers.
Aggregating across goods, NBTotal(q1, . . . ,q10), valued using village prices, is divided
by the total village price of the basket and plotted as the dashed kernel density in Figure
3. At the mean, 34.5 percent of the transfer is non-binding. However, there is a large
variance and the distribution is skewed left: 29.8 percent of the transfer is non-binding
for the median household.
The distorting effect of PAL in-kind transfers. Aggregate distortion effects for individual
food items are represented by the area between the solid and dashed CDFs in Figure 2. For
example, the most distorting item is quite clearly milk powder, while the least distorting
item is beans. Rice and oil appear to be rather non-distorting, while corn flour, cookies,
canned fish, and lentils are somewhat more distorting.
The aggregate distortion effect of the in-kind basket is represented by the difference
in means of the distributions in Figure 3; this difference is 27.9 percent of the value of the
basket.23 In level terms, in-kind PAL transfers forced households to consume on average
57.2 pesos (205.1⇥0.279) more of the 10 PAL food items than did the 150 peso cash
transfer. This distortion is not trivial in magnitude, but neither is it as complete as perhaps
would be ideal from the paternalistic donor’s point of view.
23Note that randomization only identifies mean differences between the cash and in-kind groups; without
stronger assumptions, we cannot match the distributions to answer the question of what would be consumed
under a cash transfer by those who were most distorted by the transfer in kind.
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5.2 Treatment effects on consumption
I now turn to examine how in-kind and cash transfers influenced household consump-
tion of all consumer goods, both PAL and non-PAL.
5.2.1 Aggregate consumption
Table 4 contains estimates from equation 7 for four household-level outcomes, mea-
sured per capita: total consumption (food plus non-food), food consumption only, ag-
gregate consumption of the 10 PAL foods, and non-food consumption only. The bottom
half of Table 4 contains several extra statistics: the differential effect of in-kind and cash
transfers as implemented, along with p-values from F-tests of their significant difference;
estimates of ATTEQ(Cash); the predicted effects of a 205 peso cash transfer, and their
standard errors; and the differential effects of equal valued in-kind and cash transfers,
along with p-values from tests of their significant difference.
It is clear from column 1 that, as delivered, both cash and in-kind transfers signifi-
cantly increased total consumption relative to no transfer, and that effect sizes are indis-
tinguishable from one another (p-value = 0.77). Moreover, the increases in consumption
would still be statistically indistinguishable if the cash transfer had been of equal mon-
etary value to the in-kind basket. In-kind transfers increased total consumption by 60.7
pesos per capita, while an equal-valued cash transfer would have increased consumption
by 73 pesos per capita.
Disaggregating, column 2 shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that food con-
sumption increased by the same amount under equal-valued transfer types: the difference
between ATT (IK) and ATTEQ(Cash) is a statistically insignificant four pesos. Impor-
tantly, however, households under both transfer types devoted the majority of their in-
creased purchasing power towards food. Comparing across columns 1 and 2, food com-
prised 82 percent of the increase in total consumption for in-kind households and 63
percent of the increase for cash households.
Column 3 reiterates the results from the non-parametric analysis in the previous sec-
tion. The increase in consumption of the 10 PAL foods (over the control) was significantly
higher under the in-kind transfer than under the cash transfer (both as implemented and if
they had been of equal value). Specifically, in-kind transfers induced an extra 48.8 pesos
of consumption of in-kind foods per capita, while the cash transfer only induced an 8.7
peso per capita increase. The ratio of estimates in columns 2 and 3 is the percentage of
the increase in food consumption that were on PAL foods: fully 99 percent of food in-
creases for in-kind households were on in-kind goods, compared to about a quarter of that
percentage, or 26 percent, under equal-valued cash transfers.
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Column 4 shows that neither in-kind nor equal-valued cash transfers induced signif-
icant increases in non-food consumption compared to the control, although both point
estimates are economically large. Comparing across treatments, the point estimates are
not significantly different from one another (p-value = 0.36).
It is worth noting that treatment effects are relatively large compared to the value of the
transfers. Scaling per-capita treatment effects in Table 4 up to the household level implies
multiplier effects for total consumption of 1.28 (with a standard error of 0.59) and 1.53
(with a standard error of 0.93) for the in-kind and cash treatments, respectively. These
large multipliers are not, in fact, surprising in light of similarly large multipliers from
other transfer programs in Latin America.24 One explanation (amongst many) for this
multiplying effect is that households made profitable investments in physical capital not
previously chosen due to either a lack of credit or a risk aversion profile that is declining
in income. Furthermore, the large standard errors associated with both multipliers imply
that I cannot reject the hypothesis that either is equal to unity.
Robustness of main results
The results above suggest that in-kind and cash transfers led to large increases in aggregate
consumption of similar magnitude relative to the control. The majority of transfers were
spent on food under both transfer types, and importantly, in-kind transfers did not induce
significantly more food consumption than did an equal-valued cash transfer. I check the
robustness of these main results in several ways.
First, the estimates of the absolute effects of receiving cash or in-kind transfers may be
biased if the group of eligible control households I have identified and use in the analysis
above are in fact ineligible. Guided by the fact that Table A.3 suggests that eligibility for
PAL within a village appears as-if randomly assigned, I re-run the main analyses using
all control households as the counterfactual for eligible cash and in-kind households;
results are displayed in columns 1 through 4 in Table 5. Perhaps not surprisingly, absolute
consumption growth under in-kind and cash transfers is virtually the same as in when the
matched eligible control group is used in Table 4.
Second, I show that the main results are not sensitive to excluding the in-kind group
that was randomized out of receiving educational classes (yet in fact received the same
number of classes as the group that was randomized in to receiving classes). Columns
5 through 8 of Table 5 contain the main results comparing only eligible in-kind plus
24For example, Gertler et al. (2012) find a multiplier of 1.34 from the Mexican cash transfer program
Oportunidades, Martinez (2004) finds a multiplier of 1.50 from the Bonosol old-age pension in Bolivia,
and Sadoulet et al. (2001) find multipliers ranging from 1.5 to 2.6 from the Mexican cash transfer program
to farmers, Procampo.
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education households to cash plus education households and the matched-eligible control
group, and again all point estimates change very little compared to Table 4.
5.2.2 Disaggregate consumption
Disaggregating further to individual food items allows me to explore whether the in-
crease in consumption under cash transfers were spent in a manner consistent with the
social preferences that motivated the PAL food transfers, and to what extent the PAL
in-kind transfers induced substitution amongst similar non-transferred goods.
Table 6 presents estimates of ATTEQ(Cash) and ATT (IK) from equation 7, along
with p-values from tests of their equality, for eight main consumption categories and
several sub-categories. Tne main categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the
61 food and 23 non-food categories included in the analysis, while the sub-categories are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive of each main category. The categories are largely self-
explanatory except for several “other” categories, which contain items that are consumed
infrequently, if at all, by most households.25 I discuss these categories in turn.
Fruits, Vegetables. Fruits and vegetables increased markedly under both transfer types,
and the increases of 9.6 pesos per capita under the in-kind transfer and 18.1 pesos per
capita under the equal-valued cash transfer are marginally distinguishable from each other
at the 10 percent level. In fact, fruits and vegetables comprised a significant portion
of the increase in food: about 19 and 25 percent under the in-kind and cash transfers,
respectively. To the extent that fruits and vegetables improve health, this is certainly
evidence against the paternalistic justification for in-kind transfers.
Grains, Pulses. Five of the 10 PAL goods are grain based (corn flour, rice, pasta, biscuits,
and cereal) and Table 6 shows that consumption of each was significantly higher under in-
kind transfers compared to both no transfer and to an equal-valued cash transfer. However,
increases in overall grain consumption under both transfers types are similar in magnitude
(p-value = 0.25), at 16.5 and 10.8 pesos per capita under in-kind transfer and equal-valued
cash transfers, respectively. This is evidence that the in-kind transfers induced households
to substitute away from other types of grains towards PAL in-kind grains, leading to only
a slight distorting effect of the in-kind transfers for grains overall.
Two PAL goods are pulses, beans and lentils (the only pulses included in the food
recall survey). Lentil consumption increased significantly under the in-kind transfer and
25”Other grains” include white and sweet rolls, sliced bread, wheat flour, and wheat tortillas. ”Other
starches” include oats, soy, and the corn-based drink atole. ”Junk food” includes sweet cakes (pastelillos),
fried chips (frituras), chocolate, and sweets (dulces). ”Sweet drinks” includes soda, bottled fruit drinks, and
fruit drink powder.
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not at all under the cash tranfer. The small and insignificant increase in bean consumption
reflects the earlier finding that bean transfers were largely infra-marginal.
Dairy, Animal, Fats. In-kind transfers of milk powder led to almost five times greater
consumption of milk powder than what would have been consumed under an equal-valued
cash transfer: 25.2 pesos versus 4.9 pesos per capita. At the same time, milk powder
transfers induced households to substitute away from liquid milk, as evidenced by the
12.6 peso per capita decrease in liquid milk consumption. Overall, dairy consumption
was about two times higher under the in-kind transfer compared to cash. If we believe
dairy is an important determinant of child health, this evidence again suggests that we
must examine program effects on health in order to justify transfers in-kind rather than in
cash.
There is more evidence of substitution induced by the in-kind transfers amongst animal-
derived foods and fats. In-kind canned fish transfers increased canned fish consumption
by 4.7 pesos per capita relative to cash, but these households would have consumed more
of other types of seafood under a cash transfer (ATTEQ(Cash) for seafood is 3.3 pesos,
although not statistically significant). Fats are disaggregated to the PAL in-kind good oil
and common oil substitutes, mayonnaise and lard. While the effects are small in eco-
nomic magnitude, it appears that in-kind households substituted away from consumption
of mayonaise and lard towards the oil they received in-kind.
Other food - Alcohol, Junk food. Paternalistic food transfers are often motivated by the
fear that unconstrained cash transfers will be spent on vices, such as unhealthy food and
drink, alcohol, and tobacco. The evidence in Table 6 suggests this fear is unfounded for
the PAL cash transfers. The “Junk food and Sweet drinks” category contains candies,
fried chips, soda, sweet cakes, and sweet fruit juices. There was very little increase in
consumption of these goods under both in-kind and equal-valued cash tranfered, about 2
pesos per capita under each.
Neither transfer type induced significant increases in alcohol consumption. However,
only five percent of households report consuming any alcohol at all and reported con-
sumption is likely an underestimate of true alcohol consumption as the food-recall survey
was usually answered by female head of the households who might not be aware of all
alcohol purchases by other family members. Importantly, the size of any unmeasured
program effects on alcohol consumption is limited by the fact that (more than) the entire
transfer is already accounted for in other purchases.
Non-food goods - Tobacco, Medicine, Transportation. The large (although statistically
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insignificant) increase in non-food consumption under the cash treatment, compared to the
in-kind treatment, is concentrated in purchases of schooling inputs, medicine and hygiene
products, and transportation. For example, increases in spending on medicine and hygiene
products, which includes medicine, medical fees, and personal hygiene products, are of
about the same magnitude as increases in consumption of fruits and vegetables. Tobacco,
a non-food vice, is not significantly effected by either transfer type, although the noisy
negative point estimates surprisingly suggest a negative income elasticity for tobacco.
5.3 Treatment effects on child nutrition and health
The final empirical analysis explores whether the small observed differences in con-
sumption across transfer type led to meaningful changes in the health and nutrition of
children. For each outcome other than anemia prevalance, I estimate equation 7 at the
child-level. For anemia prevalence, I use a single-differenced version of 7 as data was
only available post-treatment. All child-level models control for the gender of the child
and including age fixed effects.
Nutrition. The Panel A of Table 7 presents ATT (IK), ATTEQ(Cash), and p-values from
tests of their equality for the levels of calories and micro-nutrients. Both in-kind and cash
transfers increased caloric intake over the control, but the effects are not significantly
different from one another (p-value = 0.45).
Despite modest increases in caloric intake, it appears the in-kind transfer, and to some
extent the cash transfer, increased the intake of important nutrients amongst young chil-
dren. The in-kind transfer significantly increased iron, vitamin C, and zinc consumption
compared to the control. Equal-valued cash tranfers induced increases of similar magni-
tude (and even larger magnitude for vitamin C), however point estimates are imprecisely
estimated. Comparing treatments, there are no significant differences between in-kind
and equal-valued cash transfers on level increases in micro-nutrient consumption amongst
children.
In order to assess the economic meaningfulness of the increases in nutrient intake, I
consider as outcomes in Panel B indicators of whether a child consumed above the RDA.
As the equal-valued extrapolation is not well-defined for the distribution of treatment
effects, I report instead the observed treatment effects, ATT (Cash); these estimates can
be considered a lower bound on the effects of equal-valued transfers. The in-kind versus
cash difference in percentage of children above the RDA for vitamin C is large (eight
percentage points) and of marginal significance. Eleven and nine percentage points more
children consumed above the RDA of iron and zinc, respectively, under the in-kind than
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the cash transfer, and both differences are statistically significant.
This evidence suggests that paternalistic goal of in-kind transfers was fulfilled, at least
in part. In-kind milk powder and corn flour were fortified with vitamin C, iron, and zinc,
and children consumed more of these nutrients (although we do not know whether the
nutrients came from the specific foods that were transferred in-kind). This evidence also
suggests that cash transfers led to meaningful, albeit smaller, improvements in child nu-
trient intake. Comparing the two transfer types, however, the evidence is mixed. On one
hand, we can not reject that equal-valued cash and in-kind transfers increased nutrient
intake of the same amount. On the other, the increases under in-kind tranfers appear
to be more meaningful, as measured by moving children’s intake above the RDA; how-
ever, this last conclusion must be qualified by the fact that relative-to-RDA consumption
comparisons compare un-equal valued transfers.
Health. Finally, I explore program effects on child health. Public policy should ultimately
be concerned with changing the welfare of program recipients, not simply changing their
consumption as an intermediate step. In the case of the PAL food transfers, the main
welfare measures of interest are children’s health. Column 1 in Table 8 pools all children
and presents treatment effects for weight, height, sickness, and anemia; column 2 contains
estimates for the youngest children, aged zero and one years old, for whomwemay expect
the health effects to be the greatest. As for relative-to-RDA consumption indicators, I
do not extrapolate cash treatment effects for these outcomes: if health is increasing in
income, ATT (Cash) is likely a lower bound, and any positive effect of in-kind over cash
is likely an upper bound.
As implemented, it does not appear that either the in-kind or cash transfer affected the
weight of children. Relative to the control, point estimates of weight increases are small
and insignificant both statistically and economically. For example, the positive point
estimate of 0.1 kg for children of all ages under the in-kind transfer increases represent
an increase of less than 1 percent over baseline weight. This result holds comparing all
children (column 1) and only the youngest children (column 2).
Considering height for the entire sample of children, in-kind tranfers appear to have
caused larger gains over cash: the difference between ATT (IK) and ATT (Cash) is 0.66
cm, significant at the 6 percent level. However, this increase is small in economic terms,
representing only about a 1 percent increase over baseline. Further, it appears that the
differential increase in height is concentrated amongst children aged two through six. For
the youngest children, the in-kind and cash transfers lead to virtually the same increase in
height of 0.58 cm.
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The likelihood of being sick in the last month for all children decreased by 6 and 7
percentage points for in-kind and cash transfers, respectively. These decreases are not sta-
tistically significant, nor are they statistically different from one another, but they are eco-
nomically significant, reflecting an approximately 15 percent decrease in sickness from
baseline. The decreased sickness may be a result of the increased vitamin C intake, which
has been shown to improve immune system function (Hemila, 1992). As with weight and
height, similar and noisier estimates result for zero and one year olds.
Finally, while not statistically significant, the point estimates suggest that anemia
prevalence was reduced by a similar amount under both treatments compared to the con-
trol (a 2 percent decrease under in-kind and a 4 percent decrease under cash); these are
decreases in the prevalance of amenia of approximately 14 percent compared to the con-
trol. (This conclusion is robust to using blood hemoglobin levels, rather than anemia
prevalence, as an outcome.) It appears that the rather large increase in the percentage of
children that consumed above the RDA for iron under in-kind transfers (13 percentage
points) did not translate into lower rates of anemia.
Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that there is little differential effect on pre-
cisely measured indicators of child health after one year of treatment between PAL in-kind
and cash transfers as implemented.
6 Distribution costs
While the main focus of this paper is to test whether the paternalistic motivation for
transfers is justified, it is instructive to examine the differential distribution costs between
cash and in-kind PAL transfers. Any paternalistic benefits of in-kind transfers must be
compared to all differential costs, and high distribution costs of in-kind transfers is an
oft-cited rationale for the use of cash.26
In-kind transfers, when goods are provided rather than vouchers, necessitate extra
procurement, storage, and transportation costs, relative to cash. For PAL transfers during
the experimental intervention, it proves difficult to account for non-distribution costs,
such as salaries for staff to assemble the packages and operation costs for warehouses
where the packages were made and stored, as these costs were borne by PAL’s parent
organization, Diconsa. Regardless, pure distribution costs of moving the goods to villages
from Diconsa warehouses have been estimated to be about 30 pesos per box (Yarahua´n,
26Corruption is another potential cost, and in-kind and cash transfers are certainly susceptible to different
types of corruption, and to varying degrees. While I have no evidence on corruption under either PAL
transfer type, discussions with program administrators suggest that corruption is not a large concern in this
particular setting.
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2006) — or 20 percent of the wholesale cost of the transfer to the government.
For similar reasons relating to the interconnectedness of PAL and Diconsa, specific
information on the distribution costs of cash transfers is not available. However, PAL cash
transfers were distributed in the same manner as Mexico’s flagship cash transfer program,
Progresa/Oportunidades, and we do have good evidence on distribution costs from this
program. Specifically, Calde´s et al. (2006) report that it costs 2.4 percent of the transfer
amount in order to deliver cash to recipients (Progresa/Oportunidades transfer amounts
are roughly similar in magnitude to PAL cash transfers). Applying this estimate to PAL
implies a lower-bound on the extra distribution cost of in-kind over cash transfers of 17.6
percent of the transfer amount.
Importantly, small cash distribution costs and large in-kind distribution costs are not
unique in the developing world. For example, Calde´s et al. (2006) also report that large
government cash transfer programs in Honduras and Nicaragua have distribution costs
of about five percent of transfer amounts, while Ahmed et al. (2007) report that govern-
ment cash and in-kind food transfers in rural Bangladesh about cost about 0.15 and 20
percent of transfer amounts, respectively. Regardless of any benefits of in-kind over cash
transfers, these differences in distribution costs are too large to be ignored.
7 Conclusion
Transfers to the poor play an important role in the economies of developed countries;
as lower-income countries develop, pressure for such redistributive transfers will likely
increase. This paper highlights important issues in program design when policy-makers
are concerned that unrestricted cash transfers will not be spent in a manner consistent
with their paternalistic preferences. In the context of the Mexican government’s food as-
sistance program to the rural poor, the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL), I demon-
strate how these issues can be examined through the use of detailed surveys of recipients
and a properly designed experiment that randomly assigns in-kind and cash transfers.
For one, it is important to consider that in-kind transfers, compared to cash, may be
a blunt policy instrument. First, in-kind transfers can be infra-marginal and thus have no
effect on consumption; further, if transfers happen to be extra-marginal, recipients have
an incentive to sell or trade away the overprovided goods; and even if extra-marginal
transfers are consumed, recipients have an incentive to substitute away from similar non-
transferred items.
I find that the PAL in-kind transfers have minimal differential effects on consumption
compared to equal-valued cash transfers. In terms of overall food consumption, there
was no differential effect between transfer types. For individual PAL foods, some were
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extra-marginal and binding (such as powdered milk), but most were for the large part
inframarginal (such as vegetable oil or rice). However, there is evidence that recipients,
in the face of distorting transfers, substituted away from similar non-transferred foods.
Furthermore, it is imporant to consider that paternalistic preferences are most likely
defined over outcomes other than the consumption of the in-kind goods per se, and that
households may find it more efficient to achieve those outcomes through consumption
of non-transferred goods. In the case of food transfers, policy-makers are most likely
concerned with health outcomes, not the specific foods they supply. For PAL recipients, I
find that cash was largely spent on nutritious foods such as fruits and vegetables, and on
essential non-food goods such as medicine. It would be difficult to argue that these goods
do not further the paternalistic preferences that drove in-kind provision.
Comparing child nutrition and health outcomes under in-kind and cash transfers, I find
that after receiving tranfers for one year, the in-kind transfer did lead children to consume
more iron and zinc, most likely as a result of greater consumption of the fortified pow-
dered milk they received. However, there is little evidence that the increased consumption
of iron and zinc let to differential short-term effects of cash and in-kind transfers on child
health. The health effects of increased micronutrient consumption could appear in the
longer run, however, I leave this question for future work since the available data do not
allow for such an analysis.
Finally, it is clear that these poor, rural households did not indulge in vices (such as
alcohol or tobacco) or non-nutritious foods upon receipt of unrestricted cash transfers.
While it is unclear whether this finding generalizes to a setting with a greater supply of
vices (say, in urban areas), this is an important finding that offers specific evidence to
paternalistic policy-makers who fear such adverse effects of cash tranfsers.
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Figure 1: In-kind milk versus an equal-valued cash transfer.
In-kind transfers will only distort consumption, compared to an equal valued cash
transfer, if the transfer is extra-marginal and resale is costly or prohibited.
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Notes: Vertical lines denote in-kind transfer quantities. Data is actual consumption from treated, post-transfer households.
The distribution of each good is truncated at the 95th percentile.
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Figure 3: Kernel densities of monthly household consumption of the 10 PAL food items
as a percentage of the monetary value of the basket. [Solid = Cash households, Dashed =
In-kind households]








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corn,flour basic 3 15.5 20%
Rice basic 2 12.8 12%
Beans basic 2 20.8 13%
ForKfied,powdered,milk basic 1.92 76.2 17%
Dried,pasta,soup basic 1.2 16.2 8%
Vegetable,oil basic 1,(lt) 10.5 16%
Biscuits basic 1 18.8 8%
LenKls supplementary 1 10.4 2%
Canned,fish supplementary 0.6 14.7 2%
Cereal supplementary 0.2 9.3 1%







Table 2: Pre-treatment characteristics by treatment group







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household)Characteris0cs
?Number?of?household?members 4.68 4.59 4.53 4,706 0.57? 0.39? 0.70?
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12)
Years?of?educaJon?of?household?head? 4.50 4.35 3.96 4,703 0.53? 0.03** 0.07*
(0.18) (0.14) (0.16)
House?has?a?dirt?floor 0.30 0.29 0.31 4,706 0.88? 0.86? 0.71?
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Indigenous?household 0.19 0.17 0.13 4,706 0.75? 0.33? 0.38?
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Household?raises?animals?or?farms 0.30 0.37 0.43 4,706 0.13? 0.01** 0.17?
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Village)Characteric0cs
Diconsa?store?in?the?village 0.30 0.45 0.40 4,706 0.09* 0.33? 0.57?
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07)




In(home?food?consumpJon 308.32 292.78 292.59 4,706 0.37? 0.38? 0.99?
(14.14) (9.90) (11.15)
Non(food?consumpJon 179.73 169.53 175.05 4,706 0.50? 0.78? 0.69?
(12.40) (8.34) (11.23)
?Out(of(home?food?consumpJon 14.91 12.47 11.56 4,706 0.29? 0.21? 0.68?
(1.94) (1.26) (1.80)














Table 3: Pre-treatment child level characteristics by treatment group







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child&demographics
Age 2.99 3.07 3.08 3,280 0.28F 0.35F 0.91F
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
Male 0.51 0.52 0.49 3,279 0.8F 0.44F 0.27F
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Child&consump2on
CaloricFintake,Fdaily 864.84 840.43 827.55 1,711 0.45F 0.3F 0.66F
(26.69) (17.50) (23.98)
VitaminFCFconsumpLon,FmgFdaily 33.12 30.75 37.70 1,711 0.48F 0.36F 0.12F
(2.85) (1.69) (4.11)
IronFconsumpLon,FmgFdaily 5.30 5.14 5.07 1,711 0.55F 0.44F 0.79F
(0.23) (0.15) (0.19)
ZincFconsumpLon,FmgFdaily 4.01 3.88 3.66 1,711 0.67F 0.27F 0.23F
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Child&health
WeightF(kg) 12.19 12.52 12.45 2,237 0.22F 0.41F 0.78F
(0.22) (0.14) (0.21)
HeightF(cm) 84.95 85.89 85.65 2,189 0.29F 0.51F 0.79F
(0.72) (0.51) (0.77)
NumberFofFdaysFsickFinFlastFfourFweeks 0.35 0.38 0.38 3,244 0.45F 0.42F 0.85F
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
SickFinFlastFfourFweeks 0.14 0.10 0.10 1,711 0.17F 0.15F 0.77F
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
HemoglobinFlevelF(g/dL) 2.38 (( (( 3,244 (( (( ((
(0.26)































(1) (2) (3) (4)
In2Kind 230.97 219.41 21.87 211.56
(29.15) (16.77) (2.59) (14.02)
Cash 29.59 213.43 21.02 3.84
(31.81) (17.88) (2.92) (16.17)
POST 188.66*** 79.74*** 6.11*** 108.92***
(27.19) (15.89) (2.06) (13.75)
In2kind&x&POST:&ATT(IK) 60.71** 49.57*** 48.83*** 11.14
(28.05) (16.70) (4.08) (14.25)
Cash&x&POST:&ATT(Cash) 53.76* 33.60* 8.65*** 20.16
(32.48) (19.63) (2.91) (17.20)
Observa-ons 9,553 9,553 9,553 9,553
Differen/al(effect:&ATT(IK)&2&ATT(Cash) 6.96& 15.97& 40.19*** 29.01&
H0:&ATT(IK)&=&ATT(Cash),&p2value 0.77 0.30 0.00 0.50
ATTEQ(Cash) 72.96** 45.60** 11.74** 27.36
(44.08) (26.65) (3.94) (23.34)
Differen'al*effect:!ATT(IK)!(!ATTEQ(Cash) (12.24! 3.97! 37.10*** (16.21!
H0:!ATT(IK)!=!ATT
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
In'Kind '31.78 '19.68 '1.36 '12.10 '21.85 '13.09 '1.78 '8.76
(28.66) (16.36) (2.45) (13.74) (31.68) (19.16) (2.90) (14.70)
Cash '8.90 '12.82 '0.43 3.92 '10.21 '13.19 '1.13 2.99
(31.06) (17.32) (2.80) (15.79) (31.66) (17.75) (2.91) (16.15)
POST 195.95*** 83.43*** 7.11*** 112.52*** 197.18*** 85.64*** 6.10*** 111.54***
(27.63) (16.94) (2.18) (13.05) (29.11) (17.02) (2.20) (14.67)
In'kind$x$POST:$ATT(IK) 57.75** 48.17*** 47.95*** 9.58 73.25** 51.24** 46.50*** 22.01
(28.22) (17.51) (4.13) (13.65) (33.21) (20.49) (5.78) (16.62)
Cash$x$POST:$ATT(Cash) 49.38 31.39 7.62** 17.98 57.24* 34.00* 8.79*** 23.23
(32.72) (20.42) (2.96) (16.67) (33.89) (20.42) (2.92) (17.81)
ObservaNons 10,006 10,006 10,006 10,006 7,041 7,041 7,041 7,041
Differen.al(effect:$ATT(IK)$'$ATT(Cash) 8.37$ 16.77$ 40.33*** '8.40$ 16.01$ 17.23$ 37.71*** '1.23$
H0:$ATT(IK)$=$ATT(Cash),$p'value 0.73 0.28 0.00 0.53 0.59 0.36 0.00 0.94
ATTEQ(Cash) 67.02** 42.61** 10.35** 24.41 77.68* 46.15** 11.93*** 31.53
(44.41) (27.71) (4.01) (22.63) (46) (27.71) (3.96) (24.17)
Differen'al*effect:!ATT(IK)!(!ATTEQ(Cash) (9.27! 5.56! 37.61*** (14.83! (4.44! 5.09! 34.58*** (9.52!
H0:!ATT(IK)!=!ATT

















ATT(IK) 9.61** 5.51** 4.12**
(3.91) (2.56) (1.89)
ATTEQ(Cash) 18.10** 9.52** 8.58***
(6.46) (4.37) (2.96)




† Pasta† Biscuits† Cereal†
Other%
grains
ATT(IK) 16.50*** 2.77*** S0.08 0.83** 1.80*** 6.90*** 4.14*** 0.21
(3.55) (0.67) (2.09) (0.32) (0.34) (0.93) (0.84) (1.07)
ATTEQ(Cash) 10.78* 0.16% 5.13% S0.23% S0.05% 4.53*** 0.15% 1.04%
(5.65) (0.91) (4.03) (0.48) (0.47) (1.16) (0.82) (1.63)
ATT(IK)'='ATTEQ(Cash),'p1value 0.25% 0.00*** 0.15% 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.52%
Pulses Beans† LenNls†
ATT(IK) 2.41*** 0.27 2.06***
(0.78) (0.73) (0.22)
ATTEQ(Cash) 0.90% 0.65% 0.14%
(1.07) (1.02) (0.24)
ATT(IK)'='ATTEQ(Cash),'p1value 0.08* 0.63% 0.00***
Dairy Milk%powder† Liquid%milk
ATT(IK) 12.59*** 25.16*** S12.64*** 0.63
(3.96) (2.46) (2.68) (1.36)
ATTEQ(Cash) 5.94% 4.90*** S0.89% 2.25%
(5.80) (1.44) (4.19) (2.28)
ATT(IK)'='ATTEQ(Cash),'p1value 0.16% 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.36%
Animal Chicken Beef%&%Pork Seafood Canned%fish† Eggs Other%animal
ATT(IK) 4.32 S0.99 2.27 S0.55 4.71*** S0.92 0.26
(4.51) (2.04) (1.50) (1.88) (0.63) (0.60) (3.51)
ATTEQ(Cash) 5.61% 0.81% 1.53% 3.34% 1.64* S1.15% 0.77%
(7.12) (3.15) (2.38) (3.61) (0.84) (0.94) (5.49)
ATT(IK)'='ATTEQ(Cash),'p1value 0.82% 0.51% 0.69% 0.21% 0.00*** 0.77% 0.91%
Fats Oil†
ATT(IK) 0.45 0.82 S0.36
(0.73) (0.57) (0.36)
ATTEQ(Cash) 0.59% S0.14% 0.72%
(1.13) (0.78) (0.61)
ATT(IK)'='ATTEQ(Cash),'p1value 0.87% 0.08* 0.04**
Other%food Other%starch Alcohol Coffee Sugar
ATT(IK) 1.78 0.97** 1.31 S2.20* S0.05 2.24
(4.68) (0.46) (1.51) (1.23) (0.56) (3.13)
ATTEQ(Cash) 0.42% 1.49** 1.99% S4.60** 0.40% 2.53%
(7.01) (0.70) (2.35) (1.87) (0.89) (4.76)








ATT(IK) 11.14 3.21 5.68 S1.34 0.31 3.30 S0.53 0.48*
(14.25) (3.70) (5.27) (5.42) (1.93) (4.72) (0.51) (0.28)
ATTEQ(Cash) 27.36% 7.69% 14.60% 1.06% 0.72% 4.30% S1.29% 0.33%
(23.34) (6.14) (10.06) (8.41) (2.94) (7.30) (0.82) (0.42)













Table 7: Average treatment effects on child caloric and nutritional intake
Calories ATT(IK) 103.16** Calories ATT(IK) 0.05*
(43.53) (>0RDA) (0.03)
ATTEQ(Cash) 61.400 ATT(Cash) 0.04
(71.09) (0.03)
H0:ATT(IK)=ATT
EQ(Cash),0p@value 0.450 H0:ATT(IK)=ATT(Cash),0p@value 0.350
Vitamin-C ATT(IK) 22.15*** Vitamin-C ATT(IK) 0.24***
(mg) (4.66) (>0RDA) (0.04)
ATTEQ(Cash) 35.510 ATT(Cash) 0.16***
(12.87) (0.05)
H0:ATT(IK)=ATT
EQ(Cash),0p@value 0.290 H0:ATT(IK)=ATT(Cash),0p@value 0.110
Iron ATT(IK) 1.61*** Iron ATT(IK) 0.13***
(mg) (0.42) (>0RDA) (0.04)
ATTEQ(Cash) 1.100 ATT(Cash) 0.02
(0.65) (0.05)
H0:ATT(IK)=ATT
EQ(Cash),0p@value 0.340 H0:ATT(IK)=ATT(Cash),0p@value 0.01**
Zinc ATT(IK) 1.40*** Zinc ATT(IK) 0.16***
(mg) (0.36) (>0RDA) (0.06)
ATTEQ(Cash) 1.140 ATT(Cash) 0.07
(0.49) (0.06)
H0:ATT(IK)=ATT















Table 8: Average treatment effects on child health
All#ages Ages#0#and#1
Outcome (1) (2)




































FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
A The education treatment
This appendix details the unsuccessful randomization of PAL experimental villages
into educational classes. The treatment was motivated by a desire to test if information on
nutrition, hygiene, and health is complementary to the receipt of in-kind food transfers.
In practice, the education treatment was contaminated as many households in the “no
education” in-kind treatment group did in fact receive classes.
Data on class attendance was collected in the post-treatment survey; no administrative
attendance data is available. All households, regardless of their treatment status, were
asked the number of classes they attended and what themes were covered. They were
allowed to list up to four themes from the choices of: organization of PAL, nutrition,
health, and hygiene. Table A.1 contains attendance rates on the extensive and intensive
margins, by treatment group. Columns 2 and 4 exclude attendance at introductory classes
on the organization and operation of PAL, as every experimental village, regardless of
treatment group, was instructed to hold these classes.
Several departures from the experimental design are of note. First, among households
in the in-kind group that were not supposed to attend educational classes, 63 percent did
in fact attend non-organizational classes (column 2). Second, of the households in the
in-kind-plus-education and cash-plus-education groups that were supposed to receive ed-
ucational classes, 25 and 33 percent, respectively, did not receive any non-organizational
classes (again, column 2). Qualitative evidence from non-experimental regions in Mexico
suggests that non-compliance with the educational component of PAL was not unique to
the experimental villages (Rodrı´guez Herrero, 2005).
Third, column 3 shows that conditional on attendance to at least one class, the mean
classes attended per household- between four and five classes - were insignificantly dif-
ferent across groups. This attendance pattern is much less than the one class per month
specified in PAL rules and, given that households received on average 12 months of aid
between survey rounds, it represents an attendance rate of about 40 percent. Column 4
shows that attendance is even lower - around four classes - upon excluding organizational
classes.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to isolate why households did not attend more classes:
whether they decided to not attend classes that were actually offered, or whether the
classes were in fact not held by the Committee of Beneficiaries. In either case, the evi-
dence strongly suggests that randomization into educational classes was not successful,
41
greatly reducing the usefulness of this part of the experimental design for causal inference.
B Sample and data
B.1 Sample
Excluding incomplete surveys and split-off households, the entire surveyed sample
(including treated and untreated households) contains 6,706 baseline and 5,851 follow-up
households in 208 villages. Excluding the eight villages as described in the paper drops
an additional 306 baseline and 216 follow-up households. Thirty-five baseline and 78
follow-up households with more than half of the consumption categories missing were
then dropped, as were 11 more baseline households with no individual level information.
Finally, 143 baseline households report that a meal was prepared in the last week for
a special event. As this does not reflect normal consumption patterns, I exclude these
baseline observations from all analyses.
Further excluding untreated households in the in-kind and cash groups and ineligible
households in the control group (as described above) leaves 5,028 baseline and 4,923
follow-up households. I do not use data from any attrited households. About 10 percent
of the remaining households are missing information on one or more food items and thus
various empirical exercises use fewer observations.
The sample of children is formed from all included households, and includes 4,550
baseline and 4,129 follow-up children aged zero to six years old. 200 children have re-
ported ages that are inconsistent across survey waves; they are dropped. When nutritional
and caloric intake are used as outcomes, 363 children are dropped who consumed more
than 2000 or less than 200 calories in the past 24 hours. When weight and height are
used as outcome variables, 10 children are dropped who decrease weight or height across
survey waves, and one child is dropped with an extreme weight outlier.
B.2 Food consumption and unit-values
Households reported for each of 61 food items the quantity consumed (from all sources,
whether purchased, donated, or self-produced), the quantity purchased, and the value of
purchased quantities in the past seven days. Enumerators were instructed to convert re-
ported units into either kilograms or liters; however, the option to record units as “pieces”,
“packets”, or “other” were also available and were used in a minority of cases (this hap-
pened more often in the baseline than in the follow-up). Thus, I convert all reported units
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to kilograms or liters using conversion factors complied by the INSP. Monthly quantities
are obtained from the reported weekly quantities using a conversion factor of 4.35. I also
calculate calories and micro-nutrients consumed using a separate conversion table from
the INSP.27
The value of food consumption is obtained as follows. First, unit-values are com-
puted by dividing the monetary value of purchases by the quantity purchased, for all
households with non-zero purchases. Households purchased an average of 15 items out
of the 61 items asked about in the survey. The village level price is defined as the median
observed unit-value in the village. Consumption values are thus the product of the quan-
tity consumed and the village price. If I observe unit-values for fewer than 20 percent of
households in a village, I use the municipality median unit-value to value consumption.
If I do not observe a municipality unit value, I use the state median. Consumption in the
follow-up is valued using baseline village unit-values.
B.3 Non-food consumption
Households also reported consumption expenditures, but not quantities, in the follow-
ing categories: school and non-school transportation, tobacco, personal hygiene prod-
ucts, household cleaning products, medicine, doctor fees, school fees, fuel for cooking
and heating, electricity, rent, household items, clothes, shoes, ceremonies, and hospital-
izations. Some items were asked about at the weekly or semi-annual level and I convert
them to monthly levels. Expenditures in the follow-up are deflated to baseline levels using
the monthly CPI from the Bank of Mexico.
In defining total non-food consumption, I exclude three variables: rent, ceremonies,
and hospitalizations. Rent is excluded as data is only available on monetized rent pay-
ments and I cannot value the informal rental agreements that are likely to be present in
these rural villages. Furthermore, only one percent of the sample reports any rent pay-
ments. Ceremonies and hospitalizations are excluded as they happen infrequently, often
unexpectedly, and therefore do not represent normal consumption patterns. This is evi-
denced by the fact that fewer than five percent of households report consumption on these
items.
27I am grateful to Orazio Attanasio and Vincenzo di Maro for providing me with the INSP’s
calorie/micro-nutrient and unit conversion factor tables.
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Figure A.1: Villages in the PAL experiment
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Table A.3: Probit model predicting receipt of PAL aid in the in-kind and cash treatment
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Table A.3: Probit model predicting receipt of PAL aid in the in-kind and cash treatment
groups as a function of pre-treatment characteristics
Outcome(=
Marginal(Effect (s.e.)
Has(dirt(floor 60.012 (0.015)
Has(toilet(inside(the(house 0.018 (0.015)
Household(head(has(no(educa>on 60.022 (0.024)
Household(head(has(1(to(5(years(of(educa>on 0.001 (0.021)
Household(head(has(6(to(8(years(of(educa>on 0.015 (0.019)
Age(of(household(head 60.001 (0.000)
Dependency(ra>o 0.004 (0.009)
Crowding(index 60.007 (0.005)
Has(VCR 60.022 (0.020)
Has(a(gas(stove 0.024 (0.015)
Has(a(refrigerator 0.011 (0.014)
Has(a(washing(machine 0.015 (0.016)
Has(a(car(or(motorcycle 0.005 (0.025)
Household(head(is(male 0.010 (0.016)
Any(household(member(receives(Social(Security 0.029 (0.038)
Number(of(children(aged(5(to(15(not(in(school 0.011 (0.009)
Number(of(children(under(12(years(old 60.011 (0.007)
Observa>ons 4,280
McFadden's(Adjusted(R6squared 0.009
Sample(probability(of(receiving(PAL(aid 88.4
Notes:(((***p<0.01,(**(p<0.05,(*(p<0.1
(1)(The(included(covariates(are(iden>cal(to(those(used(by(the(Mexican(government(to(
assign(eligibility(for(social(programs.
(2)(Sample(includes(all(cash(and(in6kind(households(pre6treatment.(Standard(errors(
clustered(at(the(village(level.
(3)(Reciept(of(PAL(aid(is(self6reproted(in(the(post6treatment(survey.
(4)(The(dependency(ra>o(is(defined(as(the(number(of(household(members(below(15(and(
above(65(years(of(age(divided(by(the(number(of(members(between(15(and(65(years(of(age.
(5)(The(crowding(index(is(defined(as(the(number(of(household(members(divided(by(the(
number(of(rooms(in(the(house((excluding(hallways(and(bathrooms).
Household(received(PAL(aid
In6kind(and(Cash(treatment(
groups,(pre6treatment
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